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Abstract
We extend the domain of preferences to include menu-dependent prefer-
ences and characterize the maximal subset of this domain in which the reve-
lation principle holds. Minimax-regret preference is shown to be outside this
subset.




The revelation principle is the foundation of the theory of mechanism design (see,
for example, Dasgupta, Hammond and Maskin (1979), Myerson (1979)). Applied
to an environment of incomplete information, it states that for any Bayesian-Nash
equilibrium of any mechanism there exists an outcome-equivalent Bayesian-Nash
equilibrium of a direct mechanism in which all players report their respective types
truthfully. Thus, the revelation principle greatly simpliﬁes the search for “optimal”
mechanisms; we only need to search in the set of incentive compatible direct mech-
anisms.
The notion of Bayesian-Nash equilibrium assumes that players’ preferences satisfy
the von Neumann-Morgenstern axioms and thus, are represented by expected-utility
∗I thank Jean-Jacques Herings, Flip Klijn, Takashi Kunimoto, Ronald Peeters, Roberto Serrano
and Markus Walzl for helpful suggestions and discussions.
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1functions (von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944)). As nonstandard preferences be-
come standard in the literature, it is pertinent to ask whether the revelation principle
holds if players are not expected-utility maximizers.1 In this paper, we extend the
domain of preferences to include menu-dependent preferences, i.e., preference of a
player can depend on the set of available alternatives (which is called a menu).2
We characterize the maximal subset of this domain in which the revelation principle
holds – this requires a modiﬁed notion of the equilibrium. This subset is the set of
preference relations that satisfy what we call weak contraction consistency.
The setup is that of incomplete information in which a state is a realization of
a type proﬁle. The set of states is commonly known; however, each player privately
knows only her type. An alternative is a Savage act that speciﬁes an outcome for
every possible realization of the state. We assume that for any menu, each type
of each player has a complete preference relation over the Savages acts that are
elements of that menu. The preference relation over two Savage acts can be diﬀerent
in diﬀerent menus that contain these two acts; thus, the preferences can be menu
dependent.
We provide two results. First, if the preferences of all types of all players satisfy
weak contraction consistency, then the revelation principle holds. Second, if the
preference of any type of any player does not satisfy weak contraction consistency,
then there exists a preference proﬁle such that the revelation principle does not hold.
In this sense, the set of preferences that satisfy weak contraction consistency for all
types of all players is the maximal domain in which the revelation principle holds.
We also show that it is not possible to strengthen the second result; thus, if the
preference of a type of a player does not satisfy weak contraction consistency, then
the revelation principle can hold for some preference proﬁle.
Weak contraction consistency is weakening of contraction consistency.3 Con-
traction consistency requires that for any menu, a maximal element in that menu
remains maximal after any contraction of the menu around that element (i.e., when
the maximal element is available in the menu after the contraction). Weak contrac-
1The literature on implementation theory has also incorporated boundedly rational players; see,
for example, Hurwicz (1986), Eliaz (2002) and Cabrales and Serrano (2007).
2Sen (1993, 1994) argues for the need to incorporate menu dependence in standard rational
choice theory. Also see Sen (1997) for a formal analysis. Menu dependence of choice has been well
documented in experimental studies; see, for example, Huber, Payne and Puto (1982), Simonson
and Tversky (1992).
3Contraction consistency was originally introduced by Chernoﬀ (1954) and has alternatively
been termed Property α by Sen (1971). In its original formulation, contraction consistency is a
property of the choice function. We adapt it to the primitive of our model, a preference relation.
2tion consistency weakens contraction consistency at two levels: ﬁrst, the property
must be satisﬁed by only a class of menus – instead of any menu – and secondly,
it requires that a maximal element in a menu remains maximal after only a unique
contraction – instead of any contraction – of the menu around that element (see
Deﬁnition 2.1 for details).
Minimax regret is a menu-dependent preference relation that has been often stud-
ied in the literature starting with Savage (1951). According to minimax regret, each
type of a player chooses the alternative that minimizes her maximum regret. Regret
of choosing an alternative in a state is deﬁned as the diﬀerence between the payoﬀ
that is obtained and the maximum payoﬀ that could have been attained in that state;
since the latter depends on the set of alternatives available in that state, the relation
is menu dependent. Maximum regret of choosing an alternative is the maximum of
these diﬀerences over all states of the world. We provide an example in which the
minimax-regret preference relation does not satisfy weak contraction consistency and
consequently, the revelation principle does not hold.4
We also provide an example in which the preference of each type of a player is
menu dependent due to extremeness aversion (Simonson and Tversky (1992)) and
satisﬁes weak contraction consistency.
In presenting our results, we assume that a type of a player has a preference
relation over each menu, which is a set of Savage acts. A Savage act is an ex-ante
lottery that speciﬁes an outcome for each realization of all players’ types. However,
a type of a player plays only in the interim stage (when she knows her type) and
thus, one might argue, she should “care” about interim lotteries that specify an
outcome for each realization of other player’s types instead of ex-ante lotteries. In the
Appendix, we show that our results do not change with this alternative formulation.
The paper is organized as follows. We explain the model and collect all the results
and examples in Section 2. Section 3 provides a brief conclusion. In the Appendix,
we show that our results hold even if we assume that each type of each player “cares”
about interim lotteries.
2 Model and Results
Let N be the set of players. A type of player i is denoted by ti and the set of types
of player i is Ti. Each player privately knows only her type. Let T =
Q
i∈N Ti be
4It is known that the minimax-regret preference relation does not satisfy contraction consistency.
See Chernoﬀ (1954) for an example.
3the commonly known type space and t be a type proﬁle. t−i is a type proﬁle of all
players other than i and T−i is the set of such proﬁles.
A is the set of outcomes. ∆A denotes the set of probability measures on A. A
Savage act is a function f : T → ∆A. Let F be the set of all Savage acts. A menu
F is a subset of F.
Each type ti of each player i has a complete preference relation F
ti over each
menu F. Let F
ti and ∼F
ti be, respectively, the strict preference and indiﬀerence
relations derived from F
ti. Let ti= (F
ti)F⊆F and i= (ti)ti∈Ti.
N, T and A are ﬁxed throughout the paper. We call E = (i)i∈N to be the
environment.
Given a menu F, let ξF
i : Ti → F be an arbitrary function and denote the set of
such functions by ΞF
i . Let ψi : Ti → Ti be an arbitrary function and denote the set
of such functions by Ψi.
For any F ⊆ F, ξF
i ∈ ΞF







ψi (ti,t−i) ≡ ξ
F
i (ti)(ψi(ti),t−i),∀(ti,t−i) ∈ T.
Thus, the outcome of the Savage act h
ξF
i
ψi in state (ti,t−i) is equal to the outcome of
the Savage act ξF






ψi |ψi ∈ Ψi
o
.
For any f ∈ F and ψi ∈ Ψi, deﬁne the Savage act fψi as follows:
fψi(ti,t−i) ≡ f(ψi(ti),t−i),∀(ti,t−i) ∈ T.
Let F(f,i) = {fψi|ψi ∈ Ψi}.
Deﬁnition 2.1. We say that ti satisﬁes weak contraction consistency (henceforth










0 ∈ F =⇒ f 
F(f,i)
ti fψi, ∀ψi ∈ Ψi.
For any F ⊆ F and f ∈ F, if ξF
i (ti) = f,∀ti ∈ Ti, then h
ξF
i
ψi = fψi,∀ψi ∈ Ψi
and thus, F(ξF





i ), then F(f,i) ⊆ F. Thus,
we see that WCC is a weakening of contraction consistency at two levels: ﬁrst,






i )) and second, it only requires that a maximal element f remains
maximal after a unique contraction of the menu around f (which is F(f,i)).
A mechanism Γ = ((Mi)i∈N,g) deﬁnes the set of messages Mi available to each
4player and the outcome g :
Q
i Mi → ∆A associated with each message proﬁle. Let
Σi be the set of strategies σi : Ti → Mi of player i.5 Then, σ = (σi)i∈N is a strategy
proﬁle. Note that g(σ) is a Savage act. Let ΛΓ = [N,T,g,(Σi)i∈N,E] be the game
induced by the mechanism Γ in the environment E.
A direct mechanism is a mechanism such that Mi = Ti,∀i ∈ N. We identify a
direct mechanism ((Ti)i∈N,f) by its outcome function f, which is a Savage act. Let
Λf be the game induced by the direct mechanism in E. Note that Ψi is the set of
strategies of player i in Λf. Let ψ∗
i be the truthful strategy, i.e., ψ∗
i(ti) = ti,∀ti ∈ Ti.
Now we incorporate the fact that the preferences can be menu dependent in the
deﬁnition of the equilibrium. For any proﬁle of the other players’ strategies σ−i,
let F(g,σ−i) = {g(σi,σ−i)|σi ∈ Σi}. F(g,σ−i) is the menu of Savage acts that is
available to player i when other players are playing σ−i.








Thus, σ∗ is an equilibrium of ΛΓ if the Savage act generated by σ∗ is maximal
for each type of each player in the menu available to that player when other players
play according to σ∗.
Fix an environment E. The revelation principle states that for every mechanism
Γ and for every equilibrium outcome of ΛΓ, there exists a direct mechanism f which
induces a game Λf with an outcome-equivalent equilibrium in which all players report
their type truthfully. Note that (ψ∗
i)i∈N is an equilibrium in Λf if and only if ∀i ∈ N
and ∀ti ∈ Ti, f 
F(f,i)
ti fψi, ∀ψi ∈ Ψi.
The next theorem characterizes the maximal domain in which the revelation
principle holds.
Theorem 2.3.
1. If E is such that ti satisﬁes WCC for all ti ∈ Ti and i ∈ N, then the revelation
principle holds.
2. If t0
i does not satisfy WCC, then there exists a E = ((t0
i,(ti)ti6=t0
i),(j)j6=i)
such that the revelation principle does not hold in E.
Proof.
1. Suppose E is such that ti satisﬁes WCC for all ti ∈ Ti and i ∈ N. Let Γ be an
5We restrict ourselves to pure strategies.







−i),∀σi ∈ Σi. (1)
Let Fi = F(g,σ∗
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−i(t−i)), for some σ
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i ∈ Σi is such that σ0
i(ti) = σ
ti









i ) ⊆ Fi.
Now, let f = g(σ∗) ∈ Fi. Therefore, ∀i ∈ N and ∀ti ∈ Ti,

















i ), f ∈ Fi and ti satisﬁes WCC. Thus, (ψ∗
i)i∈N is an
equilibrium of Λf and the outcome of this equilibrium is equal to g(σ∗).
2. Suppose t0





i ) and a f ∈ F such that f F
t0




i f, for some
ψ0
i ∈ Ψi.
For all ti 6= t0





0 ∈ F. (2)
For all j 6= i, pick j such that ∀tj ∈ Tj,
f 
F(f,j)
tj fψj,∀ψj ∈ Ψj. (3)
Fix E = ((t0
i,(ti)ti6=t0
i),(j)j6=i) to be the environment.




0,ti) ∈ F × Ti,t−i ∈ T−i.
Thus, Σi = ΞF
i × Ψi and Σj = Ψj,∀j 6= i.
We argue that σ∗ such that
σ
∗
j(tj) = tj,∀tj ∈ Tj,j 6= i, and
σ
∗
i(ti) = (f,ti),∀ti ∈ Ti
is an equilibrium of ΛΓ. Note that g(σ∗) = f.
F(g,σ∗
−j) = F(f,j),∀j 6= i. This is because Σj = Ψj, all players other than j
announce their type truthfully in σ∗
−j and player i announces f in σ∗
i. It follows from























i (ti)(ψi(ti),t−i),∀t ∈ T,for some ξF
i ∈ ΞF
















i ) = F. It follows from the hypothesis and (2)












Hence, σ∗ is an equilibrium of ΛΓ and g(σ∗) = f. If the revelation principle holds,
then (ψ∗






Remark 2.4. If ti is menu independent (i.e., there exists a complete relation 0
ti
over F such that ∀f,f0 ∈ F and ∀F ⊆ F with f,f0 ∈ F, we have f F
ti f0 ⇐⇒
f 0
ti f0), then ti satisﬁes WCC. Thus, in particular, if i is an expected-utility
preference then each ti is menu independent and so it satisﬁes WCC.
Remark 2.5. We cannot strengthen part 2 of Theorem 2.3 because even if t0
i
does not satisfy WCC, there exists a E = ((t0
i,(ti)ti6=t0
i),(j)j6=i) such that the
7revelation principle holds in E. To see this, let F0 be the set of all Savage acts f such





i ), f ∈ F and f F
t0





i f for some ψ0
i ∈ Ψi. Now, F0 6= ∅ since t0
i does not satisfy WCC.





i f. Pick t00
i ∈ Ti such that t00
i 6= t0
i. Let t00
i be menu independent and such
that ∀f,f0 ∈ F,
f ∼t00
i f
0 if f,f0 / ∈ F0 or if f,f0 ∈ F0
f t00
i f
0 if f / ∈ F and f0 ∈ F
f
0 t00
i f if f ∈ F and f0 / ∈ F.
For all ti 6= t0
i,t00
i, pick ti such that it is menu independent. For all j 6= i and
∀tj ∈ Tj, pick tj such that it is menu independent. We show that the revelation
principle holds in this environment.
Pick any f ∈ F0. Consider ψ00
i ∈ Ψi such that ψ00
i (ti) = t00
i,∀ti ∈ Ti. Clearly,
fψ00
i / ∈ F0 since F(fψ00
i ,i) = {fψ00
i }. Therefore, fψ00
i t00
i f. There does not exist any



















i ; a contradiction.
Now, pick any f0 / ∈ F0. If there exists a mechanism Γ0 such that σ0∗, where











































where the last implication follows for t0
i since f0 / ∈ F0 (see the proof of part 1 of
Theorem 2.3 to argue that F(g0,σ0∗









i )) and for all other types
of all players since their preferences are menu independent. Thus, the revelation
principle holds in this environment.
Next, we provide an example in which the minimax-regret preference relation
8does not satisfy WCC and consequently, the revelation principle does not hold.
Example 2.6. We say that i is a minimax-regret preference if there exists a ui :
































Minimax-regret preference need not satisfy WCC. Consider the following example.
Suppose N = {1,2}, T1 = {t1
1,t2
1} , T2 = {t1
2,t2
2} and A = {a,b,c}. Player 1 has the
minimax-regret preference with u1(a,t1
1,t2) = 0, u1(b,t1
1,t2) = 1 and u1(c,t1
1,t2) =
2,∀t2 ∈ T2 and u1(a,t2
1,t2) = u1(b,t2
1,t2) = 1 and u1(c,t2
1,t2) = 0,∀t2 ∈ T2.
Let ψ1










































































































































Deﬁne the menu F = F(f,1)
S






Graphically, f0 has two rows and each row of f0 can equal any one of the following:






1 ) contains exactly 9 Savage acts and these are the ones































1 f, which is a violation of WCC.
Similarly, we have f F
t2
1 f0,∀f0 ∈ F. Now, using the construction in the proof
of part 2 of Theorem 2.3 and appropriately deﬁning the preference of player 2 (e.g.,
player 2 also has minimax-regret preference with u2(a,t1,tn
2) = u2(b,t1,tn
2),∀t1 ∈
T1,∀n = 1,2), it is easy to show that the revelation principle fails in this example.
Finally, we provide an example in which the preference of each type a player is
menu dependent and it satisﬁes WCC.
Example 2.7. Suppose N = {1,2}, T1 = {t1
1,t2
1} , T2 = {t2} and A = {a,b}. Then
∆A = {(p,1 − p) ∈ <2
+}, where p is the probability of outcome a; i.e., ∆A is the
unit-simplex in <2
+. Let t1 = (t1
1,t2) and t2 = (t2
1,t2). Thus, T = {t1,t2}.
For any Savage act f and any state t, let fa(t) be the probability of outcome
a in state t. Thus, geometrically, a Savage act f = [f(t1),f(t2)] is a pair of points
f(t1) = (fa(t1),1 − fa(t1)) and f(t2) = (fa(t2),1 − fa(t2)) on the unit-simplex in
<2
+.

















¯ pF(tn) is thus the “mid-point” of the menu in state tn.
For all n = 1,2, the preference F
tn





˜ f ⇐⇒ |f
a(t
n) − ¯ p
F(t
n)| ≤ | ˜ f
a(t
n) − ¯ p
F(t
n)|
Each type of player 1 thus displays extremeness aversion, which Tversky and Simon-
son (1993, p. 1183) describe as follows, “In some situations, [...] decision makers may
evaluate options in terms of their advantages and disadvantages, deﬁned relative to
10each other [...] As a consequence, options with extreme values within an oﬀered set
will be relatively less attractive than options with intermediate values.” Similarly,
in the example, the further away a Savage act is from the “mid-point” of the menu
in state tn, the less it is “liked” by type tn
1 of player 1.
By deﬁnition, tn
1 is menu dependent. Let f be any Savage act. It is straightfor-
ward to show that ¯ pF(f,1)(tn) = 1














Hence, for any Savage act f, type tn
1 of player 1 is indiﬀerent between all Savage acts
in the menu F(f,1). Therefore, tn
1 satisﬁes WCC for all n = 1,2.
3 Conclusion
We extended the domain of preferences to include menu-dependent preferences and
characterized the maximal subset of this domain in which the revelation principle
holds. The condition that characterizes this maximal domain is what we called
weak contraction consistency for all types of all players. We argued that weak con-
traction consistency is a weaker version of the well-known contraction consistency.
Although weak contraction consistency is a weak condition, we showed that an im-
portant menu-dependent preference relation, minimax-regret preference, lies outside
the maximal domain. We also gave an example in which the preference of each type
of a player is menu dependent and satisﬁes weak contraction consistency.
4 Appendix
A type of a player plays only in the interim stage. Therefore, one might argue that a
type of a player should “care” about interim lotteries that specify an outcome for each
realization of other player’s types instead of Savage acts which are ex-ante lotteries.
In that case, we need to make three changes to our model: ﬁrst, we must assume that
each type of each player has a preference relation over each interim menu, which is a
set of interim lotteries; second, we must deﬁne an equilibrium concept, say interim
equilibrium, that incorporates the interim menu that is available to each type of
each player; and third, we must restate the revelation principle as follows: for every
interim equilibrium of any mechanism, there exists a a direct mechanism with an
11outcome-equivalent interim equilibrium in which all types of all players report their
respective types truthfully. Here, we show that from any such preference relation
over interim menus we can derive a preference relation over menus such that the set
of interim equilibria of any mechanism is the same as the set of equilibria (as deﬁned
in Section 2) of that mechanism. Then it is easy to show that all the results of
Section 2 hold if this derived preference relation over menus satisﬁes their respective
premises.
An interim lottery for type ti of player i is a function lti : T−i → ∆A and let Lti
be the set of such functions. An interim menu for type ti, denoted by Lti, is a subset
of Lti. Now, let’s suppose that each type ti of each player i has a complete preference
relation ˜ 
Lti
ti over each Lti ⊆ Lti. Let ˜ ti = (˜ 
Lti
ti )Lti⊆Lti and ˜ i = (˜ ti)ti∈Ti.
Pick any mechanism Γ and consider the game ˜ ΛΓ = [N,T,g,(Σi, ˜ i)i∈N] induced
by the mechanism. For any strategy proﬁle σ, the interim menu available to type ti
of player i is Lti(σ−i) = {g(mi,σ−i)|mi ∈ Mi}. We say that a strategy proﬁle σ∗ is











First, we derive a complete preference relation ti= (F
ti)F⊆F from ˜ ti. For any
Savage act f, deﬁne f|ti : T−i → ∆A as f|ti(t−i) = f(ti,t−i),∀t−i ∈ T−i. For any
menu F ⊆ F, deﬁne F|ti = {f|ti |f ∈ F}. By deﬁnition, f|ti ∈ Lti and F|ti ⊆ Lti.
Finally, deﬁne F
ti as follows: ∀f,f0 ∈ F, let f F




ti is complete because ˜ 
F|ti
ti is complete. Let i= (ti)ti∈Ti.
Next, consider the mechanism Γ. We argue that a strategy proﬁle σ∗ is an
equilibrium of ΛΓ = [N,T,g,(Σi,i)i∈N] if and only if σ∗ is an interim equilibrium
of ˜ ΛΓ = [N,T,g,(Σi, ˜ i)i∈N]. Notice that Lti(σ−i) = F(g,σ−i)|ti. Therefore, ∀i ∈ N
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